"""Sensitive-data redaction for Inspector artifacts."""

from __future__ import annotations

import re
from typing import Any, Optional

# Field / attribute name hints (case-insensitive).
_SENSITIVE_NAME_RE = re.compile(
    r"(password|passwd|pwd|token|secret|cookie|authorization|auth|otp|"
    r"captcha|verify.?code|verification.?code|sms.?code|pin)",
    re.I,
)

_PHONE_RE = re.compile(r"(?<!\d)(?:\+?86[-\s]?)?1[3-9]\d{9}(?!\d)")
_EMAIL_RE = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}")
_TOKENISH_RE = re.compile(r"\b(?:Bearer\s+)?[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{24,}\b")

REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"


def is_sensitive_field_name(name: str) -> bool:
    return bool(_SENSITIVE_NAME_RE.search(name or ""))


def looks_sensitive_value(value: str) -> bool:
    s = value or ""
    if not s:
        return False
    if _PHONE_RE.search(s) or _EMAIL_RE.search(s) or _TOKENISH_RE.fullmatch(s.strip()):
        return True
    if "password" in s.lower() or "secret" in s.lower():
        return True
    return False


def sanitize_artifact(value: Any, *, sensitive_hint: bool = False) -> Any:
    """Recursively sanitize event/evidence data before it is persisted.

    ``redact_input_payload`` protects the normalized Action input, but recorder
    events also contain copies of the same value in target snapshots, ancestry
    and raw_event.  All persisted copies must pass through one boundary.
    """
    if isinstance(value, dict):
        input_type = str(value.get("input_type") or value.get("type") or "").lower()
        field_name = str(
            value.get("name")
            or value.get("field")
            or value.get("automation_id")
            or ""
        )
        local_sensitive = bool(
            sensitive_hint
            or input_type == "password"
            or is_sensitive_field_name(field_name)
        )
        out: dict[str, Any] = {}
        for key, item in value.items():
            key_sensitive = local_sensitive or is_sensitive_field_name(str(key))
            if key in {
                "name", "automation_id", "class_name", "control_type",
                "framework_id", "path_hint", "logical_name",
            } and isinstance(item, str) and not key_sensitive:
                # Machine identifiers can be long token-like strings (for
                # example conversation_list_container) without being secrets.
                # Still remove explicit personal data embedded in a label.
                out[key] = _EMAIL_RE.sub(REDACTED, _PHONE_RE.sub(REDACTED, item))
                continue
            if key in {"value", "text", "input", "typed", "content", "plaintext"}:
                if item in (None, ""):
                    out[key] = item
                elif key_sensitive or looks_sensitive_value(str(item)):
                    out[key] = REDACTED
                else:
                    out[key] = redact_text(str(item))
            else:
                out[key] = sanitize_artifact(item, sensitive_hint=key_sensitive)
        if local_sensitive:
            out["sensitive"] = True
        return out
    if isinstance(value, list):
        return [sanitize_artifact(item, sensitive_hint=sensitive_hint) for item in value]
    if isinstance(value, tuple):
        return [sanitize_artifact(item, sensitive_hint=sensitive_hint) for item in value]
    if isinstance(value, str):
        if sensitive_hint or looks_sensitive_value(value):
            return REDACTED
        return redact_text(value)
    return value


def redact_text(value: str, *, force: bool = False) -> str:
    if value is None:
        return ""
    s = str(value)
    if force:
        return REDACTED
    s = _PHONE_RE.sub(REDACTED, s)
    s = _EMAIL_RE.sub(REDACTED, s)
    return s


def redact_input_payload(
    payload: dict[str, Any],
    *,
    field_name: str = "",
    input_type: str = "",
) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
    """
    Return (redacted_copy, was_sensitive).
    Never leave raw password/token in action_flow / catalog.
    """
    sensitive = False
    out = dict(payload or {})
    itype = (input_type or out.get("input_type") or "").lower()
    fname = field_name or str(out.get("name") or out.get("field") or "")

    if itype == "password" or is_sensitive_field_name(fname):
        sensitive = True
        for key in ("text", "value", "input", "typed", "content"):
            if key in out and out[key] not in (None, ""):
                out[key] = REDACTED
        out["redacted"] = True
        return out, True

    for key in ("text", "value", "input", "typed", "content"):
        if key not in out:
            continue
        raw = out.get(key)
        if raw is None:
            continue
        s = str(raw)
        if looks_sensitive_value(s) or is_sensitive_field_name(str(out.get("name") or "")):
            sensitive = True
            force = ("@" in s) or bool(_PHONE_RE.search(s)) or bool(_TOKENISH_RE.search(s))
            out[key] = redact_text(s, force=force)
            if _TOKENISH_RE.fullmatch(s.strip()) or looks_sensitive_value(s):
                out[key] = REDACTED
    if sensitive:
        out["redacted"] = True
    return out, sensitive


def redact_element_fields(el: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], bool]:
    out = dict(el or {})
    sensitive = False
    name = str(out.get("name") or out.get("automation_id") or "")
    role = str(out.get("control_type") or out.get("role") or "")
    input_type = str(out.get("input_type") or out.get("type") or "")
    if input_type == "password" or is_sensitive_field_name(name):
        sensitive = True
        if out.get("value"):
            out["value"] = REDACTED
        if out.get("text"):
            out["text"] = REDACTED
        out["sensitive"] = True
        return out, True
    for key in ("value", "text", "name"):
        if key not in out or out[key] in (None, ""):
            continue
        s = str(out[key])
        # Stable element names/automation ids are locator structure.  Long
        # machine identifiers (OperationAndSendMessageRegion, generated DOM
        # ids, etc.) must not be destroyed merely because they look token-like.
        # Personal data embedded in a visible name is still scrubbed.
        if key == "name":
            cleaned = _EMAIL_RE.sub(REDACTED, _PHONE_RE.sub(REDACTED, s))
            out[key] = cleaned
            sensitive = sensitive or cleaned != s
        elif looks_sensitive_value(s):
            sensitive = True
            out[key] = REDACTED
    if sensitive:
        out["sensitive"] = True
    # Edit controls with password-ish class
    if "password" in role.lower() or "password" in str(out.get("class_name") or "").lower():
        sensitive = True
        out["value"] = REDACTED
        out["sensitive"] = True
    return out, sensitive


def redact_locatable_rows(rows: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> tuple[list[dict[str, Any]], bool]:
    any_sens = False
    out: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
    for r in rows or []:
        cleaned, sens = redact_element_fields(r if isinstance(r, dict) else {})
        any_sens = any_sens or sens
        out.append(cleaned)
    return out, any_sens


def screenshot_sensitivity_meta(
    *,
    may_contain_sensitive: bool,
    save_sensitive_screenshots: bool = False,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
    return {
        "may_contain_sensitive_data": bool(may_contain_sensitive),
        "save_sensitive_screenshots": bool(save_sensitive_screenshots),
        "note": (
            "截图暂时无法可靠脱敏；敏感页请关闭截图或人工审查。"
            if may_contain_sensitive
            else ""
        ),
    }